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There is a growing scepticism regarding the implementation of the European Union Global 
Strategy (2016), which builds on the idea of fostering resilience to the east and south, in a 
neighbourhood increasingly threatened by governance breakdown and violent conflict. 
Scholars highlight the vagueness of resilience, as well as the existing contradictions between 
policy sectors and member states’ preferences, as key elements constraining EU foreign 
policy. In response to these shortcomings, the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ is currently being 
deployed to entertain a geopolitical EU and implement the Global Strategy more efficiently. 
This paper discusses how the idea of strategic autonomy is used, contrasts it with that of 
resilience as envisioned in the Global Strategy, and highlights some unforeseen risks for 
the EU external action: 1) strategic autonomy might be unrealistic in the short term and thus 
widen the gap between capabilities and expectations; (2) intervening geopolitically can also 
imply a move away from aspirations to foster resilience in a constructive and cooperative way 
with other partners.
Pol Bargués is research fellow at CIDOB, Centre Barcelona for International Affairs, where he 
coordinates the Horizon 2020 project on EU’s external action (EU-LISTCO). In his research, Bargués 
explores and contributes to debates in international intervention, peacebuilding and resilience. More 
specifically, he has examined the evolution of EU external action and has specialised in interventions 
in post-conflict countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo. 
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(Sage).
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In 2020, less than four years after the publication of the Global Strategy, the vision of the former High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/
VP), Federica Mogherini, was put under stress as the world turned upside down. The Covid-19 pandemic 
revealed the European Union (EU)’s vulnerabilities in the health sector and generated economic conse-
quences that may set back investment in security and defence. Abroad, tensions flared up between the 
United States and China, while nationalist perspectives that favour state-centric (rather than multilateral) 
actions burgeoned in Europe and elsewhere. The great powers continue upgrading their nuclear arsenal, 
raising fears that the ‘world is in the throes of an arms race’ (Maulny 2020). Also, Eastern and Southern 
Partnership countries are affected by order contestation (CO) derived by geopolitical tensions and hold 
areas of limited statehood (ALS) affected by multifarious risks that have a destabilizing impact on go-
vernance and conflict both for the neighbourhood and the EU, as demonstrated by EU-LISTCO research 
findings (Fahmi and Sasnal 2020; Kakachia and Lebanidze 2020).
While the Global Strategy was initially valued for operationalizing a ‘principled pragmatism’ frame-
work, combining norms and interests, through the idea of fostering resilience abroad (Tocci 2020), 
we have noticed a growing dissatisfaction within EU policy circles and academic analysts. Some of 
the limitations identified respond, in part, to the vagueness of resilience, as well as the existing con-
tradictions between policy sectors (as Cadier et al. (2020) have shown, EU security concerns in Tuni-
sia, migration management in Bosnia, or economic interests in Libya have undermined prospects for 
enhancing societal resilience in these countries). 
In consequence, an emerging perception is that the path initiated by Mogherini with a preference 
for strengthening resilience (through the means of long-term, non-linear approaches and the mobil-
isation of bottom-up diplomatic resources and partnerships) is too soft and ambiguous for a world 
which is increasingly dominated by great power rivalry and contestation. While the Global Strategy 
already responded to a complex and contested world where the European project and the liberal 
international order were growingly questioned, the shock of 2020 has aggravated geopolitical tensi-
ons and brought major uncertainties in ALS and CO (Flockhart 2020; Newman 2018). Thus, a wide 
consensus in the literature is that the EU needs a bolder strategy to develop autonomy and coheren-
ce in security and defence instruments to then take actions to foster resilience in ALS and CO and 
ultimately have greater impact in a post-liberal world order (Biscop 2020; Sabatino et al. 2020).
The EU has recently embraced the ‘language of power’ in foreign policy, as an attempt to meet the de-
mand for greater assertiveness (Borrell 2020a). Josep Borrell replaced Mogherini as HR/VP on December 
1st, 2019, with a clear ambition to implement the Global Strategy. In the initial months of his mandate, 
Borrell endeavoured to further diplomacy and find collective responses to global challenges. However, as 
the pandemic has accelerated socio-economic uncertainties and great power contestation, Borrell has 
placed greater emphasis on the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’, which he defines as ‘the ability to think 
for oneself and to act according to one’s own values and interests’ (Borrell 2020b). Although the concept 
has received particular attention since the early 2010s, in debates concerning the possibility of building an 
EU defence industry independent from NATO, Borrell makes it central to correct the shortcomings of EU 
foreign policy. He also expands its meaning beyond the traditional sectors of defence and security with the 
aim of being influential, geopolitical, and defending Europe’s interests: ‘we need to close many capability 
gaps and loopholes and to be present and active in areas where our interests are at stake (Borrell 2020d). 
Yet a question emerges after an emphasis on geopolitics and the widening of strategic autonomy: is it 

























In this policy paper we assess whether the increasing emphasis on strategic autonomy in the 
process of implementing the Global Strategy represents a move away from the vision set up by 
Mogherini and anticipate whether it may have implications on the aim to strengthen resilience to 
the East and South. We build on previous research done at EU-LISTCO, engage with key recent 
academic publications, as well as analyse a sample of EU latest reports and essays written by 
Borrell in the last year. We divide the policy paper in two sections: a first where we dissect the key 
elements of resilience under Mogherini’s Global Strategy and subsequent documents, and a se-
cond examining the logic that have led Borrell to make strategic autonomy the foremost concern 
to implement the Global Strategy. While it is too early in Borrell’s mandate to reach conclusions, 
we pursue two contributions: 
First, we clarify the concept of strategic autonomy. We argue that, rather than a change in the 
opposite direction, it is meant to complete the realist foreign policy shift that began with the pu-
blication of the Global Strategy, where the EU recognized the need to be more pragmatic to adapt 
to an international conjecture of complexity and uncertainty. It is a concept which acknowledges 
greater antagonism between great powers and wishes to revert Europe’s loss of capacity and 
influence. So, acquiring strategic autonomy in all policy sectors would imply greater integration 
of instruments and perspectives among member states, as well as the possibility of being more 
forceful and strategic in taking action and building resilience in global affairs. 
In the conclusion of the policy paper, we build our second contribution. We seek to open a debate on 
the unforeseen risks that obtaining strategic autonomy may bring for the EU external action. While 
it gives a certain horizon of unity and strength in the medium term, it might be unrealistic and thus 
widen the gap between capabilities and expectations. The second risk that is drawn is that the EU 
might be refusing (or suspending) a resilience-oriented foreign policy of sustained and bottom-up 
actions when putting a premium on geostrategic interests and concerns. Rather than leading to co-
operation and multi-lateral solutions, the focus may turn out to be on unilateral actions to contain the 
threats that emerge in a troubled neighbourhood.
1. ‘PRINCIPLED PRAGMATISM’ AND THE 
IDEA OF RESILIENCE SET UP IN THE 
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The Global Strategy was carefully designed to ‘navigate this difficult, more connected, contested 
and complex world’ (EEAS 2016: 13). This perception of complexity, Nathalie Tocci explains, was 
the result of the instability, violence and fragility of neighbouring countries, as much as the growing 
unease with EU’s liberal and democratic values and norms both inside and outside the union (Tocci 
2020). The neighbourhood seemed unstable and conflicts like Syria and Libya had local, regional and 
global implications (EEAS 2016: 29): 
“To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and vi-
olence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic 
growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are 
mounting, while climate change causes further disruption” (EEAS 2016: 7). 
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Moreover, the Global Strategy was conceived in a very convoluted moment, as it was published only 
a week after the Brexit referendum and a few months before Trump won the elections in the US, 
which reinforced the trends of Euroscepticism and antiglobalism (Larik 2018). 
In response to a world in disarray, the EU external action pivoted around the vision of ‘principled 
pragmatism’, combining a ‘realistic assessment of the strategic environment’ as well as an ‘idealistic 
aspiration to advance a better world’ (EEAS 2016: 13, 16). A far cry from the aspirations to become a 
leading normative power that could export liberal values, as expressed in the early 2000s, the Global 
Strategy appeared more modest in its aims and more cooperative in its methods (Barbé and Morillas 
2019; Morillas 2019). A key to advance in this ‘principled and pragmatic’ direction was the idea of 
resilience, which was defined as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and 
recovering from internal and external crises’ (EEAS 2016: 23).
Although resilience already appeared in the 2012 Commission Communication on food security 
and the Resilience Action Plan 2013-2020, it developed more consistently in the EU Global Strategy 
(2016) and the ‘Joint Communication on a Strategic Approach to Resilience’ (2017). Notwithstanding 
that resilience has a variety of interpretations among different EU member states and even within EU 
policy documents (Joseph 2018), it represents a move away from ‘quick-fix’ and ‘top-down’ interven-
tions of statebuilding and democracy promotion (Börzel and Risse 2018). Therefore, a resilience-in-
formed foreign policy has built upon two axis that reinforce each other:
(1) Long-term, sustained action – The approach to foster resilience to the east and south provided 
a common compass and shared language to different policy communities that had traditionally un-
derstood their work as separated and ruled by specific institutional logics (Tocci 2020). Resilience 
would bridge all discrepancies: under the same umbrella of fostering resilience to fragile societies, 
development or peacebuilding agents concerned with long-term fixes would link their tasks to those 
working for more immediate security logics. Resilience was a policy framework to bring together all 
EU policy communities, actors and institutions and represented a step towards a ‘joined up’ external 
action (EEAS 2017:49).
The idea of achieving internal cohesion in different policy sectors has been key to involve multiple 
actors and use all instruments at disposal to tackle all phases and dimensions of conflicts and cri-
ses (Bargués et al. 2020). The interdependence and complexity of conflicts and crises were seen to 
require sustained engagements to tackle root causes and address unpredictable, non-linear effects 
in the future. As the Joint Communication on a Strategic Approach to Resilience puts it, there is ‘the 
need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, non-linear approach to 
vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on anticipation, prevention and preparedness’ (EC & HR/VP 2017: 
2). The Global Strategy similarly referred to a ‘multifaceted approach to resilience’, which consists in 
assisting fragile societies in many policy areas through a sustained and resourceful action. The EU’s 
complex intervention in the Sahel region, where diverse tools have been complementarily deployed, 
shows how these ideas translate into practice:
“different instruments, including CSDP missions, complement each other in bolstering 
the resilience of local states and societies. Humanitarian aid helps tackle the imme-
diate crisis of displaced people, while development cooperation addresses the lon-
ger-term root causes of poverty, further complemented by actions for job creation, 

























(2) Bottom-up and cooperative action – The approach to foster resilience consists of interventions 
that are ‘bottom-up’ and include cooperative ways of addressing crises. Bottom-up strategies re-
spond to the recognition that local actors need to own and lead crises recovery plans. Therefore, 
instead of imposing an external idea of resilience or merely pursuing an elite-driven approach to 
governance reform, the EU pursues a ‘multi-level’ approach where different actors cooperate (EEAS 
2016: 29). The idea is to bring together international and national policymakers, as well as diverse civ-
il society groups and the private sector, to share their experiences and views in pursuit of collective 
answers to local, regional, and global affairs (Göldner-Ebenthal and Dudouet 2017). Although critical 
scholars have pointed out that the EU has failed to enact a truly bottom-up approach, where local ac-
tors own and lead the process of building resilience (Ejdus and Juncos 2018), remarkable initiatives 
include the annual Brussels conferences on ‘Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region’ that have 
been organized since 2017 to support the UN Geneva talks on Syria. Similarly, the project ‘Iraq and 
its Neighbours: Enhancing Dialogue and Regional Integration in West Asia’ promotes multi-level dia-
logues through a series of bilateral and multilateral workshops that bring together civil society rep-
resentatives from Iraq and its immediate neighbours: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. 
Linked to this new brand of multi-level diplomacy, Mogherini increased the EU’s visibility abroad 
and emphasized connectivity between the EU and all the regions of the world to work towards 
multi-lateral solutions. In sharp contrast to the isolationism of the US under the Trump adminis-
tration, Mogherini understood that the EU had to be present abroad. More than her predecessors, 
she travelled on numerous occasions to Africa, Asia, and Latin America to communicate the EU’s 
policies and actions and strengthen partnerships with other countries and regions. Reacting to 
international developments, she also made constant statements and declarations to increase the 
visibility and voice of the EU. Rather than seeking to enforce European norms and values abroad, 
she pursued partnerships and collective answers, making multilateralism central: ‘We will contin-
ue to be a principled, reliable, consistent and cooperative global player, a point of reference for 
multilateralism’, asserted Mogherini (2019) in the first International Day of Multilateralism and 
Diplomacy for Peace in April 2019.
In sum, in a connected and complex world, Mogherini constructed a foreign policy that was princi-
pled and pragmatic at the same time, experimenting with a sustained (long-term) and cooperative 
(bottom-up) way to foster resilience (EEAS 2016: 16–18). However, her term ended in November 
2019 with no grandiloquent successes. Unlike her predecessors, Javier Solana, who could claim the 
glory for ending the Balkan wars and conducing complex statebuilding processes in Kosovo, Bosnia 
and Macedonia, or acting as a peace mediator during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008; or Catherine 
Ashton, who could boast about creating the EEAS in 2010, leading the negotiations to freeze Iran’s 
nuclear programme in 2013, and mediating between Serbia and Kosovo who reached an agreement 
to normalize the relations in 2013, Mogherini’s record is seen as less exuberant. Although she had a 
prominent role in the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 to reach the agreement in 2015 or in 
the ratification of the Paris agreement in 2016, critics have suggested that under Mogherini the EU 
external action has gradually lost the capacity to lead and influence global affairs, taking instead a 
much more modest and reactive path (Joseph and Juncos 2019).
In the past years, there is a growing perception that the EU’s responses need to be faster and more 
strategic to foster resilience in the neighbourhood (Biscop 2020). Academics and policymakers tend 
to agree that resilience is too vague to mobilize coherent and efficient action. As another EU-LISTCO 
report found out: ‘there is a risk that, in spite of the framework documents adopted by EU institutions 
on the topic, resilience becomes, in practice, a new “constructive ambiguity” in EU foreign policy; that 
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is, a malleable and vague concept that each member state re-articulates based its own preferences 
and objectives’ (Cadier et al. 2020). It is for this reason, that academics push for greater coordination 
to enable action: ‘Fostering resilience consequently requires a preliminary “resilience audit” in order 
to better understand existing strengths and weaknesses in each state, region and policy area. The 
EU can only fine-tune its objectives and instruments and develop targeted strategies if it is equipped 
with such important and focused knowledge’ (Gaub and Popescu 2017: 93). It was telling that in the 
webinar commemorating the 10th anniversary of EEAS – that had as a title The EU in a Changing 
World and brought into conversation Solana, Mogherini and Borrell – Solana also criticized Mogheri-
ni for having lost influence in the world stage. ‘We started with much less infrastructure than the one 
that Federica [Mogherini] had or Pepe [Josep] Borrell has today. I think we had less power but had 
more influence; probably today the HR has more power, more people at its disposal … but I dare to 
say we had more influence’, he claimed. 
In addition to the demands of greater concretion and strategy, there is the observation that the se-
curity situation has deteriorated. In 2019, the report assessing the implementation of the Global 
Strategy issued a gloomy forecast: 
“We now live in an even more contested world than we did only a few years ago. Con-
testation is playing out in the strategic, economic and political spheres. Strategically, 
non-proliferation and arms control are at risk. Economically, trade tensions and tech-
nological polarisation threaten both to damage the global recovery after the 2008-9 
financial crisis, and to make it harder to manage security issues. Politically, we have 
seen the emergence of different political narratives, some of which openly contest the 
values underpinning liberal democracies  worldwide,  and  those  of  the  EU  itself” 
(EEAS 2019: 8).
In 2020, the situation got worse still. How did the EU external action react, as instability and conflict 
intensified, and a world affected by the Covid-19 pandemic complexified?
2. BUILDING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY TO 
REVITALIZE THE GLOBAL STRATEGY?
Josep Borrell started his mandate in December 2019 and in the early months sought to implement 
the Global Strategy, following the steps of Mogherini and focusing on strengthening resilience 
through the pursue of sustained and cooperative actions. In one of his first appearances as HR/VP, 
at the COP25 in Madrid, Borrell linked climate change to ‘multifaceted’ problems such as social jus-
tice and migratory pressures; he underlined the need for ‘collective action’ and committed to ‘do[ing] 
everything at my disposal to reinforce our impact and generate truly global cooperation on climate 
action’ (Borrell 2019).
In January and February 2020, before Europe became a Covid-19 hotspot, Borrell visited Belgrade 
and Pristina to reinvigorate the dialogue to normalize the relations between the two; and then also 
travelled to both Teheran and Washington, consecutively, to preserve the deal and help to ease the 
tensions generated when a US military strike killed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard General Qassem 

























Latin America & the Caribbean, and Central Asia, always promoting cooperation in a variety of key 
policy areas – from trade and climate change to security and migration. He kept connected with 
the world when travel restrictions due to the pandemic were imposed and wrote almost weekly in a 
blog titled ‘A window on the world’ to be visible elsewhere and communicate a common narrative of 
the EU. His are the half-ironic, half-adventurous words that sum up EU’s ambition and willingness to 
dissociate from Trump’s anti-globalism: ‘we need to make multilateralism great again’.
However, in 2020, the pandemic of Covid-19 triggered dangerous dynamics in international relations 
that jeopardized the strategy that Mogherini had envisioned, such as the spiralling of great power 
rivalry between the US and China, the widening of social and economic inequalities or the disruption 
of conflict-affected societies like Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen (Bargués 2020; Bi-
scop 2020). Even if the victory of Joe Biden in the US elections and the beginning of the distribution 
of the vaccine in December was a beacon of hope for many (Stiglitz 2020), for Borrell the crisis is 
deep-seated. As he argues:
“[The] crisis of multilateralism did not start just recently with the election of Donald 
Trump. Which means that it will probably not end up with that of Joe Biden. I see mainly 
three reasons for this crisis: the multiplication of actors; the return of national sover-
eignty, above all with actors such as China, Russia or Turkey; and the increasing com-
plexity of problems, which implicitly makes their resolution ever more difficult” (Borrell 
2020c).
This perception of complexity and the return of geopolitical tensions has led Borrell to emphasize the 
need for a further pragmatic, realist turn. ‘The geopolitical upheavals we are witnessing today underli-
ne the urgency with which the European Union must find its way in a world increasingly characterized 
by raw power politics. We Europeans must adjust our mental maps to deal with the world as it is, not 
as we hoped it would be’ (Borrell 2020a). The point highlighted in this section is not that Borrell has 
swiftly turned the Global Strategy around. Rather, we seek to suggest how Borrell’s doctrine is rein-
vigorating the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ to unite and develop capacity to act alone, if necessary, in 
times of increasing complexity and multipolar contestation.
The concept of strategic autonomy has gradually acquired greater significance in European par-
lance in the past decade, generally in relation to the need to build a defence industry independent 
from NATO. It was mentioned only in passing in the Global Strategy, as important for the EU to be 
self-sufficient and obtain peace and security: ‘An appropriate level of ambition and strategic auto-
nomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond 
its borders’ (EEAS 2016: 19). Since then, strategic autonomy has gradually gained importance in 
the subsequent developments and implementation of the Global Strategy. The EU Council has 
operationalized new instruments to deepen defence cooperation such as the Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence (CARD) in November 2016 or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
in December 2017. Also, the European Commission has promoted the creation the European De-
fence Fund (EDF) that uses EU budget to finance research and development of defence products 
and technologies by enterprises, research centres, national administrations, international orga-
nisations and universities. Although the implementation of these instruments is still embryonic 
and haunted by political constraints (such as NATO’s scepticism or critique of EU’s apparent de-
coupling), these instruments boost the strategic autonomy of the EU to become an international 
security actor (Sweeney and Winn 2020). 
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Yet, Borrell is determined to take strategic autonomy to the next level. While the Global Strategy sho-
wed calculation, demanding an ‘appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy’, Borrell thinks 
the more generally autonomy the better. While the concept usually refers to increasing capability in 
defence matters, he has widened its meaning to encompass all policy fields (Borrell 2020b). Again, 
the trigger seems to be the pandemic:
“It is crucial for the strategic-autonomy discussion to expand far beyond the issues 
of defense and security. As the coronavirus disease crisis has shown, issues such 
as public health and economic interdependence are no less important… The Co-
vid-19 crisis has revealed the fundamentally asymmetrical nature of interdependen-
ce, and the vulnerability of Europe. Science, technology, trade, data, investments are 
becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics” (Borrell 2020b).
For Borrell, ‘the weight of Europe in the world is shrinking’ and the interconnectedness of the world’s 
problems opens opportunities as well as discloses Europe’s vulnerabilities (Borrell 2020d). A degree 
of autonomy in all areas is thus desirable: 
“Strategic autonomy is the conceptual framework that Europe needs to understand 
these issues and how they relate to one another. Viewed in isolation, face masks and 
medicines are not strategic products. But the strategic calculus changes when the pro-
duction of such items is concentrated in just a few countries. The same applies to the 
sourcing of rare metals, social media and other digital platforms, and technologies 
such as 5G” (Borrell 2020b).
The key question for this policy paper is whether the centrality of strategic autonomy in the imple-
mentation of the Global Strategy may contradict the direction of resilience taken by Mogherini in the 
genesis of the Strategy. The idea expressed by Borrell, that ‘the Union must learn quickly to speak 
the language of power’, is often criticized by commentators, as a deviation from an external action 
dominated by norms and principles (Weiler 2020). An insistence on achieving autonomy could pos-
sibly imply an inward-looking move to cut off global interconnections and dependencies, while also 
being reluctant to embrace sustained and multi-level, multi-lateral initiatives. Yet, Borrell does not see 
strategic autonomy as contradictory with building resilience. We interpret it as a double movement 
of first looking inward, to build capacity and coherence, and then outward to intervene abroad decisi-
vely, being able to sustain interventions and partnerships.
For Borrell, or so it seems, the first step to acquire strategic autonomy in all policy sectors and avoid 
depending on others in world affairs is looking inward, for greater cohesion and cooperation between 
member states. While all High Representatives have perceived the division of Member States as a 
burden to undertake efficient and rapid action, the growing internal contestation and politicisation 
of EU foreign policy, which adds to the current international conjecture of instability and turmoil, has 
made the building of a joined external action a foremost priority (Barbé and Morillas 2019; see also, 
Cadier and Lequesne 2020). This is one of the reasons why Borrell reiteratively argues that most EU 
foreign policy actions ought to be decided by qualified majority, rather than unanimously by all its 
members.
He also stresses the need to work on a gradual alignment of the variety of perspectives that Euro-

























problems, the more they will agree on what to do about them’ (Borrell 2020e). This cohered under-
standing is vital to manage foreign crises successfully. 
“From the Sahel and Libya to the eastern Mediterranean, there is no shortage of 
crises that demand a strong European response. The task for the EU is to define 
a common position from which it can act in the interest of maintaining regional 
stability. To succeed, Europe must develop its own framework for monitoring and 
analyzing threats, so that it can move quickly from threat assessment to operatio-
nalization and response. That is why we are now developing a Strategic Compass” 
(Borrell 2020b).
Drawing on an intelligence analysis of the full range of threats and challenges the EU faces, the 
Strategic Compass will provide coherence into European defence when adopted by member states 
in 2022 (EEAS 2020). 
The second step to build strategic autonomy is a commitment to taking action. For Borrell, deepe-
ning strategic autonomy in all policy sectors does not imply a withdrawal from the international are-
na. Far from isolating from the rest, the EU must step into the great outdoors: constantly engaging 
in global affairs. As he puts it, the opposite of strategic autonomy is ‘complacency’, neglect of duty 
(Borrell 2020e; 2020b). Also, importantly, he does not imply that once autonomy is acquired, EU’s 
interventions will be unilateral. On the contrary: ‘The EU needs to achieve this kind of autonomy, while 
at the same time strengthening our alliances and preserving our commitments to multilateralism 
and openness’ (Borrell 2020b). Indeed, the threat scanning that will lead to the Strategic Compass is 
meant to define concrete priorities and enable action in four clusters that further the Global Strate-
gy’s vision: crisis management, resilience, capability development, and partnerships (EEAS 2020). In 
short, Borrell acknowledges that in a complex world with increasing contestation and antagonism, 
the EU must be autonomous to be able to find a balance between cooperating ‘with others whenever 
possible’ and acting ‘alone when necessary’ (Borrell 2020e).
The two moves taken by Borrell to develop strategic autonomy – a quest for internal cohesion to then 
act strategically in foreign policy – should not be understood sequentially; the two feed into each 
other reciprocally. The cohesion of member states’ views on foreign policy will lead to a more capa-
ble external action, as much as acting abroad will draw together the EU and defy Euroscepticism. In 
doing both at the same time, Borrell seeks to reenergize what Mogherini attempted with ‘resilience’ 
(the quest for a framework to coordinate all actors and policy fields and intervene in a sustained and 
cooperative way with partners) by correcting its apparent weaknesses. In response to the critiques 
of vagueness and irrelevance (Korosteleva and Flockhart 2020), Borrell insists on strategic autono-
my to nurture further internal coherence, build capacity, and take action in ALS and CO. ‘If we do not 
act together now, we will become irrelevant as many have argued cogently’ (Borrell 2020d). Strategic 
autonomy is becoming the distant horizon to be longed for, which will keep EU foreign policymakers 
occupied: 
“Strategic autonomy is not a magic wand but a process, a long-term one, intended to 
ensure that Europeans increasingly take charge of themselves. To defend our interests 
and values in an increasingly harsh world, a world that obliges us to rely on ourselves 
to guarantee our future” (Borrell 2020d).
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Strategic autonomy seems to be emerging as the key concept to operationalize the Global Strategy 
in a (post-)Covid world. It permeates through all policy sectors, not only defence and security, and 
seems apt to build greater coherence and capacity for action. In this sense, it seeks to overcome 
the shortcomings identified in the ‘principled and pragmatic’ vision of the Global Strategy, where 
resilience appeared as too vague and elusive for policymakers (Cadier et al. 2020). As it is currently 
framed, therefore, in bringing forth a double move – growing strong internally to act constructively in 
foreign policy – greater strategic autonomy may be useful to sublimate the ‘principled and pragmat-
ic’ vision of the Global Strategy. However, the unforeseen direction that we seek to grapple with here 
also brings in some risks that ought to be considered. While it is too early to reach conclusions on the 
direction taken by the current external action service, we raise two points to open a discussion that 
may be useful to EU policymakers as well as academic debates beyond EU-LISTCO. 
The first has to do with the shrinking capacity that the EU has to deliver on what it promises. The 
Covid-19 crisis has revealed a high degree of interdependency most European policy sectors have 
with external countries; the crisis has fuelled nationalist perspectives and may force member states 
to relegate European integration on security and defence to the back burner. So, becoming autono-
mous strategically seems a daring objective to grow strong and correct the accusations of irrelevan-
cy of the past, yet it reopens the debate on how to close the gap between expectations and reality 
(Rieker and Blockmans 2019). While external crisis-response capacities have increased since the 
Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the expectations diminished with the realistic outlook of the Global Strate-
gy, with higher expectations, the gap widens again. Will this be a stimulus to greater capacity-building 
and integration or instead lead to another phase of utter disappointment and Euroscepticism?
Secondly, strategic autonomy implies finding a balance between ‘cooperating with others whenever 
possible and acting alone when necessary’, but this is generally a fragile balance in EU foreign policy. All 
too often the EU may be then tempted to act alone or negotiate with elites (rather than a whole of society 
approach) and give priority to the protection of Europe over finding ways of cooperating with others. This 
bias may definitely become a departure from the ideal of resilience as transformation that EU-LISTCO 
aspires to (see, further, Börzel, Risse and Stollenwerk 2021). It even seems to represent a move away 
from the idea of fostering resilience in a constructive way, as promoted by Mogherini, while contradicting 
one of the central lessons learnt and pronounced in the Global Strategy:
“We will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities with 
our partners and contributing to their strengths. We have learnt the lesson: my neigh-
bour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses. So we will invest in 
win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a 
zero-sum game” (EEAS 2016: 4).
It is timely to think of the risks involved in building strategic autonomy. For being strategic may imply 
to withdraw connectivity, break relations and partnerships, rather than creating new and sustaining 
or even intensifying existing partnerships. This may also generate further reaction and contestation 
in the neighbourhood or among other great powers. The bottom line is that the EU may be developing 
a pragmatism without principles and finally lose its distinctiveness as a normative actor in interna-
tional relations (Biscop 2020). Whether this is a path that suits the EU will depend on Europeans as 
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